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: Tactics Employed

Tactics Employed by FighterBombers Operating Against
Special Targets
Report, 2nd Tactical Air Force, 17 December 1944

1. During the past six months fighter-bomber
attacks have been carried out by 2nd Tactical
Air Force (2 TAF) against a series of special
targets in France, Belgium and Holland. These
operations have involved a considerable amount
of pre-flight planning, and the results obtained
have varied considerably. A brief analysis of these
operations outlined below has brought to light
certain contributory factors to their success or
failure.
2. The main targets for special attention have
been:(i) Enemy Military and SS Headquarters.
(ii) Canal lock gates.

An idea of the pre-flight planning and tactics
involved in these forms of attack may be gained
from a closer study of the particular targets.

Enemy Military Headquarters
3. HQ buildings during the period May – August
1944 were mainly situated in large houses or
chateaux, which lay in their own grounds well
apart from any other buildings, and invariably
well defended by flak. These targets were firstly
attacked by rocket projectile (RP), but as the
primary aim was the complete demolition of
the building in the shortest possible time, and
although the attacks were well co-ordinated
and pressed home, they did not result in the
complete destruction of the building. It was later
found that the shallow dive attack, carried out
by aircraft using 1,000-lb MC [medium capacity]

or 500-lb MC bombs was far more successful in
these operations than the standard RP attack,
on account of the poor “near miss” value of the
latter. A section of four aircraft, carrying 1,000-lb
M.C. bombs, fused 11 secs. delay, with another
two sections of RP operating as anti-flak, would
approach the target at about 8,000 feet. The antiflak aircraft would then commence to dive when
approximately 5 miles from the target, closely
followed by the bomber force flying in echelon to
starboard. The bombs were released at a height
of about 500 feet, the method of aiming being to
keep the sight on the target when releasing the
bombs and not to pull through, as the normal
tendency for bombs at that height and angle is
to over-shoot.
4. During the period September – December
1944, a number of Gestapo and SD (Security
Police) Headquarters were subjected to attack
by fighter-bombers. The pre-flight planning for
these targets was more involved, owing to the
fact that they were situated mainly in densely
populated areas, and which required pinpoint
accuracy. This planning was very largely aided
by the extremely accurate information available
from ground sources in the occupied territory
regarding:(i) Hours of duty of enemy personnel.
(ii) Location of vital documents.
(iii) Construction of the building or buildings.
(iv) Flak in the area.

5. A model of the target was then constructed,
showing its position relative to prominent
landmarks to facilitate the lead in, obstructions,
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and flak pinpoints. It was then necessary to
investigate the damage required, which was
usually:(i) The destruction of vital documents.

target. RP and cannon have been found to be
particularly effective in neutralising the flak in
the target area, and also act as an excellent decoy
for the bomber force, which invariably comes in
almost unnoticed.

(ii) The killing of the Headquarters personnel.

6. Earlier operations had proved that the
bombing of this type of target did not necessarily
result in its complete destruction. In point of fact,
in two previous attacks ground sources reported
that the enemy had recovered more than twothirds of the documents scattered during the raid.
In order to insure complete destruction by fire, it
was found that a mixed load of 1,000 M.C. and
500 lb. M.75 (phosphorous-filled) bombs, fused
11 secs. was the most effective, as the 1000-lb
bomb, hitting the building would break the walls
and scatter the contents, and when immediately
followed up by incendiary bombs would start a
conflagration.
7. The attack was carried out in a similar
manner to the earlier attacks, with RP aircraft
acting as anti-flak. It is essential that the bomber
force run into the target in a shallow dive, as
opposed to 0-feet attack; otherwise the bomber
section leaders do not see the target in time and
may pass to either side of it, possibly seeing it
too late for last minute correction. In addition,
low-level bombing invariably results in the
bomb striking the ground and ricocheting for a
considerable distance past or to one side of the

8. The attacks on the Quisling headquarters at
Amsterdam on 26 November and the Quisling
headquarters at Rotterdam on 29 November
are interesting examples. On both occasions the
attack was preeceded by marker aircraft, who
slightly preceeded the main force and successfully
marked the target with phosphorous headed RP.
One squadron then went in at low level and the
last squadron finally dive bombed the target.
Although the attack was well co-ordinated and the
target accurately dive bombed, both operations
were unsuccessful for the following reasons:(i) Owing to certain technical difficulties, 500-lb
(M.76) bombs were not carried, so that although
the building was well hit with 1,000-lb bombs,
there were no incendiaries in the load to cause
a conflagration.
(ii) As pointed out above, the low level attack on
29 November was a failure owing to the fact that
the leader was too low to see the target ahead
and passed to one side of it.

Right: A still shot from gun camera footage captures a
Typhoon rocket attack.
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A Supermarine Spitfire of 2nd Tactical Air Force is bombed up with a
500-pounder in preparation for a dive-bombing attack in France.

Lock Gates
9. Since the commencement of operations
in Holland and western Germany, increasing
emphasis has been laid on the disruption of
barge traffic in the area vital for supply of enemy
military stores in the forward areas. Thus the
canal lock gates, which are spread at intervals
and control large expanses of waterway, have
received considerable attention from Typhoon
fighter bombers. The more important sluice
gates are well defended by flak, which is so
positioned as to cover all possible approaches to

the target. It is essential, therefore, that the flak
positions be accurately plotted on the pre-flight
planning model in order that the anti-flak aircraft
can position themselves correctly for a well coordinated strafe. It has been found that the best
form of attacking this type of target is to operate
two sections of four fighters bombers carrying
1,000-lb MCs fused 11 secs., supported where
necessary by twice the number of RP aircraft
acting as anti-flak. The approach to the target is
made in “finger” formation at about 8,000 feet
to 10,000 feet with the anti-flak aircraft flying
slightly above and on either side of the bomber

LCMSDS Photo Collection

A Typhoon of 440 Squadron RCAF is prepared for its next mission. In the foreground lie some 1000-pound bombs.
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Rows of 3-inch rocket projectiles, used by the Hawker Typhoon, lay in readiness for the next mission.
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The dangers of low-level attacks are evident in
these two photos:
Above: A Spitfire from 411 Squadron RCAF
displays damage received during an attack on a
bridge in the Nijmegen area in September 1944.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre PMR 78-253

Left: A Typhoon returned from an attack on a
bridge in the Rouen area with a fuselage full of
flak damage.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre PL 30161
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A Rocket-firing Typhoon of a British squadron sits ready for its next mission in Normandy
while two other Typhoons taxi out to the runway for an operational sortie.

force. When about 5-7 miles from the target the
anti-flak aircraft split into sections and dive
down in loose echelon starboard on to their predetermined flak positions, whilst the bomber
force lose height down to ground level when
approximately 5 miles from the target, and on
the final approach i.e. about 2 miles, pull up to
500-feet to release their bombs, breaking away
at low level until well clear of the target area. Two
very effective attacks were carried out against the
lock gates at Sneek and Gaarkeuken in Holland
on 11 November 1944. Both operations resulted
in the lock gates receiving direct hits which
put them out of action for several days. The
enemy, however, has endeavoured to overcome
the effects of these attacks by rapidly erecting
temporary locks a short distance up-stream,
so that the waterway may be again immediately
re-flooded and barge traffic continue. In view of
this, particular attention must be paid to the area
immediately after the attacks, and if photographic

reconnaissance reveals repair work in progress
to the locks and/or erection of temporary ones,
another attack must be made with the least
possible delay. The 1,000 lb MC fused 11 secs., is
quite sufficient to destroy or severely damage the
lock walls, whilst near misses between the canal
bank and the lock gates will invariably damage
the operating mechanism.
10. It is imperative for this type of operation that
the leader of the first section gauges accurately
the moment to pull up before release in order
that sufficient interval is allowed for sighting
and releasing of the bombs, at the same time not
exposing the sections to flak for too long a period.
11. In conclusion, it is hoped that an analysis of
attacks on further special targets can be made in
the near future, and these will be made available
as soon as possible.
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